

The European Security Strategy: A Framework for EU Security Interests?

GERRARD QUILLE

There are key differences between the European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted in December 2003, and the US National Security Strategy (USNSS). Whereas the USNSS emphasises the notion of ‘pre-emption’, a unilateralist approach to international security; the ESS commits the EU to a *multilateral* approach to security challenges, embodied in international law and the UN Charter. Both the ESS and the USNSS embrace a ‘comprehensive concept of security’ in proposing to tackle common security threats by drawing on a developed toolbox. The ESS does prescribe an alternative approach to ‘unilateralism’. However, it presently provides a benchmark to assess European responses to international security rather than describes a manifestly new approach.

Europe at a Crossroads

In December 2003 the European Council formally adopted ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ as the European Security Strategy (ESS).¹ The document was drafted by the Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR) Javier Solana and endorsed as a draft at the Thessaloniki European Council on 19 June 2002.² The ESS is based upon a comprehensive or holistic approach to security. It states that the EU and its member states will cooperate to tackle their security priorities in a framework that emphasizes multilateral institutions (specifically the UN and regional organizations) and the rule of law (upholding the principle of the use of force as a last resort). This means that even security ‘threats’ of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and international terrorism should be addressed through ‘effective multilateralism’. In other words, the EU will face such threats and challenges by supporting the UN system, strengthening national responses through EU synergies and by addressing root causes such as poverty and weak governance through community instruments and regional dialogue.

The EU approach to security, distinct from the actions of some of its member states, has been described as fundamentally different from that of the United States. In the US National Security Strategy (USNSS) similar

references can be found to a broad understanding of security problems (such as HIV/AIDS and poverty) and a multilateral commitment to meeting such challenges (such as in its references to the millennium development goals), but they have been overshadowed by references to rogue states, military power and the right of the United States to act unilaterally under a concept of pre-emption.³ President Bush's rhetoric on the 'war against terrorism', 'the axis of evil' and the US-led invasion of Iraq has prompted most observers to conclude that 50 years of shared experience of security in the Cold War and a common understanding of contemporary security challenges (terrorism, WMD, failing states and organized crime) still highlight fundamental differences between US and European approaches to security.⁴

Whilst Europeans themselves are divided over Iraq, the difference between the two documents (ESS and USNSS) derives from the nature of the EU as a multilateral organization and the institutionalization of this comprehensive concept of security, which promises to clash with a US single-mindedness to pursue its security interests, referred to as unilateralism.⁵ There are, and will continue to be, many areas where common cooperative approaches can be applied, such as in cooperative threat reduction programmes in Russia. However, key differences in approach will lead to competitive or confrontational behaviour and disputes over the legitimacy of the use of force to achieve security objectives. The challenge here for the Union is not just how to engage with the US on the differences but also how to avoid internal conflict and division, as witnessed over Iraq, that promise to undermine this comprehensive and cooperative approach to security and thus the effectiveness and credibility of any EU role in international security. Fundamentally, the novelty of the European approach will be to retain its distinctive agenda and to convince others, in particular the United States, that the Union's approach and the values it promotes are important in how we contribute to international security and prevent violent conflict.

Global Challenges and Key Threats

In June 2003 the SG/HR stated that the ESS was a necessary response to the profound changes in the international security environment, requiring security priorities to centre on international terrorism and WMD proliferation.⁶ The SG/HR stressed that Europe can no longer remain hesitant and divided if it is to meet the promise of its origins, as a community of democracies interested in building a stable regional security community in its external relations. He argued, with reference to a comprehensive notion of security, that active engagement is also in Europe's security

interests since these are affected by poor governance, insecurity, poverty and conflict far beyond its borders. Europe must therefore meet these challenges, which it is well placed to do with a range of diplomatic, development, economic, humanitarian and military instruments. This comprehensive approach to understanding security moves beyond a traditional military threat assessment. Solana described a 'new environment' where diffuse challenges must be addressed by the Union including poverty, energy dependence, climate change and bad governance. A comprehensive approach is required because such challenges undermine regional stability and contribute to violent conflict which in turn affects 'European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to home, above all in the Middle East'.⁷

The ESS identifies several traditional concerns related to the proliferation of WMD, terrorism, failed states and organized crime. The novelty which makes them 'new threats' lies in the belief that, as Solana states, 'Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatization of force – we could be confronted with a very radical threat, indeed'.⁸

An appropriate response must be understood in the context of Solana's comments that 'no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own' and that: 'In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold war, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means'.⁹ Addressing each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, political, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, and humanitarian aid to tackle the immediate crisis. The use of economic instruments will support reconstruction, and civilian crisis management can be used to support the restoration of civil government. The European Union, Solana argues, is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.¹⁰

Solana argues that both the new environment and the new threats must be tackled by a full range of instruments, that is, by a strategy that employs a comprehensive security toolbox.

In Solana's first draft, the term 'pre-emption' attracted media attention and provoked criticism. In the second draft the term was replaced by 'preventive strategy' and the language on WMD changed from 'the single most important threat' in the first draft to 'potentially the greatest threat to our security'. This has placated the media and has been seized

upon by some to represent a climb-down by so-called hard-liners such as Robert Cooper in the General Secretariat.¹¹ In reality those masters of ‘decoy’ might have distracted the media with those terms in the first place whilst they fine-tuned the strategy. Evidence for such an argument can be found in the remarkable similarity of this section with that of the UK Ministry of Defence White Paper released on 10 December 2003 (see www.mod.uk).¹² If one wanted to play the same ‘word-games’ pre-emptive might be *less* controversial than preventive when understood in a military context.¹³ Nevertheless the ‘Global Challenges and Key Threats’ are sufficient to appeal to diverse member state interests, although Cooper himself recognizes that once horizons have been broadened to achieve consensus, one must return to the business of developing more precise strategies and implementing policies.¹⁴ This might be one more case of constructive ambiguity as well as the seed of future dispute.

Solana’s speech put to rest any fears that the EU would adopt a US-style strategy of pre-emptive military engagement, as had been mischievously suggested by some media reports.¹⁵ Even when the SG/HR used the term ‘pre-emption’ in the first draft he highlighted that it was clearly rooted in political engagement, whereby: ‘Spreading good governance, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order’.¹⁶

The description of the new security environment, its challenges and key threats and its reformulation in the second draft is the result of differing member states’ views. Even when the first draft referred to controversial concepts such as ‘pre-emption’ they were qualified in such a way as to distance the Union from comparison with the US and its role in Iraq. In the second draft the effort to differentiate the Union from the US was taken a stage further by removing the term pre-emption altogether and replacing it with the terms ‘preventive strategy’. The language on WMD was also toned down and the section given more balance to the existing environmental concerns of the 1990s, that is, intra-state and regional conflict and organized crime.

Strategic Objectives

The ESS develops the combination of a comprehensive security concept and a multilateral approach when it identifies the EU’s strategic objectives:

- to tackle the threats;
- to extend the zone of security around Europe;
- to strengthen the international order.

Facing the New Threats

The first objective responds to the 'new threats' and emphasizes the EU's strengths based upon its response to September 11 with 'a package that included the creation of a European Arrest Warrant, measures to attack terrorist financing and an agreement on mutual legal assistance with the US'. Likewise it refers to existing approaches to support non-proliferation such as the 'Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction', which includes a commitment to the universalization of non-proliferation and disarmament regimes along with a commitment to make those regimes effective by dealing with compliance and enforcement issues.¹⁷

Within the Common Strategy on Russia, the EU has also established a practical 'hard security' programme on nuclear non-proliferation. It develops a US initiative launched in June 1999 under its Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI) and was built on by the EU's Non-proliferation and Disarmament Co-operation Initiative (NDCI).¹⁸ This is a significant and practical non-proliferation effort that encourages European and US cooperation, and commits almost one-quarter of the whole CFSP budget.

The EU strategy includes offering assistance to secure weapons and materials of mass destruction and encourages compliance with international regimes which third states will be expected to accept if they wish to profit from trade and development agreements. This 'mainstreaming' of non-proliferation and disarmament activities is seen as an area where the EU provides value added and one that will attract less controversy than the military approaches adopted in Iraq by the United States and the UK.¹⁹

Securing the Neighbourhood

The second of the strategic objectives covers the Union's existing role in the enlargement process, but also with a view beyond the new wider neighbourhood. It has been recognized that the very powerful 'carrot' of enlargement has had an important impact on stabilizing the EU's eastern periphery. However, there will now be a period of adjustment as the new and old members adapt to the realities of an enlarged Union. This will require a new effort, to consolidate security within the EU's enlarged borders and to extend stability beyond.²⁰

Enlargement has also been described as extending the project of establishing peace within the Union, to old enmities in eastern and central Europe. Whilst the twin approaches defining enlargement, ('stabilization' and 'integration'), provide significant security functions, they have often

fallen under other policy areas rather than under the CFSP/ESDP.²¹ Concerns have been raised about what comes after the present round of enlargement because signs of ‘enlargement fatigue’ might slow down the process:

Enlargement has undeniably been the Union’s most successful foreign policy instrument. It has been the main motor of the massive political and economic transformations that have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe since the early 1990s. That motor could falter if the internal dynamism of an enlarged EU weakens.²²

It has yet to be seen how the ESS will provide a focus for consolidating the security gains from enlargement (stability and integration) and provide momentum to extend that security to neighbouring states. This ought to build on the success of enlargement and its focus on ‘stabilization’ and ‘partnership’ without ruling out ‘integration’. In taking this aspect of the strategy forward intense discussions have focused upon the issue of internal/external coherence of the Union.²³

Here the European Commission is also deeply embedded in security-relevant activities with a strong geographical focus, most notably in its emerging ‘wider neighbourhood’²⁴ framework that extends into central and eastern Europe to take into account the impact of the enlargement of the Union’s eastern border.²⁵ Incoherence has been a strong feature of the Union’s approach to the region, with competing interests between the member states and the Commission and indeed between different agencies of the Union. While the United States provides a challenge to the Union’s comprehensive approach on matters of high priority for the international community, then the Union and the member states themselves provide the greatest challenge to the objectives of the ESS in the Balkans because of their inability to achieve greater coherence. The implementation of the ESS in the Balkans provides an important test case as to whether the comprehensive security approach can be applied as prescribed in the ESS. Indeed, the ability to achieve greater coherence in its new neighbourhood ought to be a measure of how credible the approach is in the wider world where the EU has a weaker presence and less developed strategies. If Iraq represents a test case for the US approach, the ability of the ESS to lead to greater coherence in the Union’s future role in the Balkans ought to be a measure of the success of the EU’s approach.²⁶

Effective Multilateralism

The third strategic objective provides the most important difference between US and European approaches. It refers to the means by which

a regional multilateral actor, the EU, can extend its influence and support international responses to security challenges through: 'The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order'.²⁷ This objective places the importance of the UN system centre stage, whereby: 'The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.' To achieve this, the ESS includes a rather clear commitment: 'We want international organizations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken.'²⁸ The transatlantic relationship is characterized as 'one of the core elements of the international system' and NATO as an 'important expression' of this relationship.

The emerging ESS emphasizes a comprehensive approach to understanding and responding to contemporary security threats and challenges. In its objectives and prescriptions it emphasizes the strengths of existing EU instruments and the need for strengthened relationships and an international legal framework. This type of approach is described by Solana as 'effective multilateralism' and is a recurrent element in western European and the EU's approach to security. In 1995 a post-Cold War comprehensive security concept inspired the Western European Union's Common Concept.²⁹ Indeed the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) includes five such fundamental objectives as expressed in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam as being:

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principle of the United Nations Charter;
- to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principle of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;
- to promote international cooperation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.³⁰

When speaking about the current unique state of prosperity and peace within the EU, the ESS points to a Deutschan³¹ concept about the role of a security community cooperating within Europe: 'The creation of the European Union has been central to this development. It has transformed

the relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens. European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and cooperating through common institutions.³² In the following paragraph the role of the United States and NATO is hailed because it 'has played a critical role in this success though its support for European integration and its security commitment to Europe through NATO'.

It notes that whilst the United States is the most dominant military actor this is not enough because 'no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems entirely on its own'. The success of the Union, enlargement and the member states' commitment to its institutions are all elements of the EU contribution to security in Europe. Europe's security, however, is not a given, and there are still security threats and challenges to be addressed that cannot be tackled alone or by military force. The conclusion is that the Union's cooperative and institutional approach to security remains valid and important as the EU takes up greater global responsibilities in meeting its own security needs. Effective multilateralism is therefore strongly identified with the very essence of the Union. No such strong assertions can be found in the US National Security Strategy. Furthermore, the US document gives little credit to Europe in security matters. Yet, for all these strong assertions the Union still cannot rely on a consolidated culture of unity between the member states when it comes to foreign policy as witnessed for years under the CFSP and recently during the Iraq crisis.

The Military Dimension

A Common Strategic Culture?

While the existing policy frameworks indicate the current depth of the Union's geographical interests such as in the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, they evolved prior to the establishment of an EU Security Concept or Strategy.³³ Initially the need for an EU security concept to inform the development of such policy frameworks and instruments met with resistance.³⁴ Talks of a unique EU civilian power have been challenged by descriptions of a more robust concept of EU civilian power.³⁵ The comprehensive notion of security with the reality of a helpless Europe in the 1990s proved sobering in EU security discussions after Kosovo. The result has been broad agreement by analysts and politicians that Europeans need to strengthen their military security instrument if it is not to become obsolete altogether.³⁶

The absence of a security concept or strategy has also been described as an obstacle to developing a European strategic culture which in turn

would help foster greater political will to cooperate in the area of foreign policy under the CFSP. The ESS may be an important first step along the road to an EU strategic culture. Although expectations are rising, and even if the European Council has adopted a security strategy and launched two military operations, member states and the EU institutions still have a long way to go in refining the institutional architecture, integrating the different policy instruments and providing clarity on concepts left unclear in the ESS. The development of the institutions and a policy framework for a security strategy are an important part of the socialization of the EU and the development of a strategic culture, whereby:

the institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the accepted range of legitimate and effective policy instruments, together with general recognition of the EU's legitimacy as an international actor with military capabilities (albeit limited).³⁷

Cornish and Edwards warn against the dangers of not achieving this strategic culture because: 'Without it, any political aspirations can only appear disconnected and either empty or superfluous. And the acquisition of serious capabilities becomes even more unlikely'.³⁸

Solana recognizes the importance of developing an EU strategic culture. He notes that the development of such a strategic culture will improve decision-making, facilitating rapid and, if necessary, robust intervention in crisis situations.³⁹ This was absent for much of the 1990s during the unfolding tragedy in the Balkans and again during the Iraq crisis. Progress in this area will critically determine how easily Europeans split again in the face of future crises or when rapid determined action is required. However, this also depends on member states providing the appropriate decision-making structures, which although 'functioning' in Operations *Concordia* and *Artemis*, do not meet ideal standards for crisis management, military hierarchies, civilian interaction and, not least, democratic accountability.

Multilateralism and Use of Force

The 'effective multilateralism' outlined in the ESS does not preclude the use of force as a last resort and may even be interpreted as permitting 'pre-emptive' action under certain circumstances. There is even an undefined reference to 'disarmament operations', leading to criticism of the concept, as ill defined, and even contradictory.⁴⁰ However, the Security Strategy should be read in context and although it identifies security priorities which meet current US concerns, it does not amount to a European endorsement of US methods. It has no illusions regarding the weakness of

the EU as a military power. Indeed, the Union's lack of military capability is highlighted as a major weakness in the EU Crisis Management/Conflict Prevention toolbox. However, these references are situated in a broader reflection on the EU's instruments and values. The strategy provides a framework within which traditional EU priorities (conflict prevention, poverty reduction and good governance within regional dialogue) are balanced with the new member-state priorities of responding to WMD proliferation and international terrorism. By concentrating on underlying causes the ESS aptly emphasizes the commonality of approach that should be applied to both new and old priorities.

The present debate, including in the ESS, has avoided serious consideration of the level of force and under what circumstances Europeans envisage for the evolving ESDP. This has been deliberate because there is as yet no consensus in Europe, as shown during the Iraq crisis. Solana has implied that such a discussion is needed:

As we increase capabilities in the different areas, we should think in terms of a wider spectrum of missions. This might include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform.⁴¹

The military instrument of the CFSP, the European Security and Defence Policy has been vaguely articulated in the form of the Petersberg Tasks. France and the UK, first at St. Malo in 1998 and then in February 2003 at Le Touquet, have highlighted the close relationship between the values of the CFSP and the objectives of its military instrument, by agreeing that:

the potential scope of ESDP should match the world-wide ambition of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy and should be able to support effectively the EU's wider external policy objectives to promote democracy, human rights, good governance and reform.⁴²

In London on 24 November 2003 they further stated:

Our two countries remain committed to the continued development of the EU's capacity to take decisions and act in crisis management. . . . Our two countries now wish to build on these first steps in crisis management operations in two areas: the relationship between the EU and the UN in the field of crisis management; and further work on capability development. . . . we now propose that the EU should build on this [operation Artemis] precedent so that it is able to

respond through ESDP to future similar requests from the United Nations, whether in Africa or elsewhere.⁴³

Here the military instrument of the CFSP is firmly set within the values and objectives of both the Union's CFSP and the UN framework. This in itself provides a profound insight into the level of military organization and capabilities needed to support the Union's emerging security strategy. These interests are geographically worldwide and in support of values such as human rights, democracy, good governance and a rule-based international framework through the United Nations.

At the 17 November 2003 Conclusions of the External Relations Council the member states' foreign ministers endorsed a plan to 'define' by June 2004 the presently opaque Petersberg Tasks for the EU according to a deadline of 2010. An important aspect of this new process will be whether we can move to a clearer articulation of areas of interest and military needs in order to guide defence policy and planning – or whether the EU will keep to a narrow, bottom-up, capability-driven, building-block approach (under the European Capability Action Plan, ECAP) focused on filling capabilities gaps and refining institutional decision-making processes. Although these existing processes are necessary to improve capabilities and support the development of a strategic culture, without defining when the EU might use force and how, it might not be enough to generate the political will to act under still controversial legal and political frameworks. We have witnessed already the negative consequences which appeared in the 2003 division over Iraq on WMD and terrorism, and during the 1990s divisions were evident on humanitarian intervention (such as in Kosovo).

If the EU cannot have an open discussion about areas of interest and the implications for the use of force it is difficult to see how the EU can achieve an adequate calculus of military needs. Furthermore, the potential range of operations (at the bottom and top ends of intensity), the level of concurrency, sustainability and logistics support are only possible to define sensibly after a broader discussion on the purpose of the EU's military instrument. Forces for operations in Africa (perhaps with local partners) require different force mix and planning considerations than a force designed for intervention when 'boarding ships on the high seas' to inspect cargo as envisaged under the Proliferation Security Initiative.⁴⁴ Nor might this level of planning be useful for more robust 'counter-terrorism' operations (such as those alongside the US Operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan) or the possibility of more political and manpower-intensive operations such as peacekeeping forces in the Middle

East (admittedly not immediately likely but the idea has been floated more than once) or specifically in Iraq.

All of these considerations, including what the reference to ‘disarmament operations’ means in the ESS, have yet to be broadly discussed. These have all been put to one side under the first Headline Goal Process and might usefully be discussed in the new round of defining the Petersberg tasks. Most officials and officers in the military staff suggest that these discussions take place internally – how else can they produce useful scenarios? However, there is also another aspect to this that requires a more public approach, and that is to help build an intra-European consensus and to be transparent to the outside world. Second, a number of extremely contentious issues at the national level must be addressed if the RRF is ever to be deployed in low- or high-intensity military combat missions: namely what is meant by ‘rapid deployment’ and how can this be achieved between 25 member states with 25 separate national processes, some of which, such as Germany, have strict parliamentary approval regarding the use of force. At the moment this aspect of the debate is being left to individual member states. Peter Struck, the German Defence Minister, said during the NATO Informal Defence Ministerial in Colorado Springs that he would ‘speed up’ the process of reforming parliamentary control. So far his efforts to change a ‘political culture and parliamentary tradition’ have been easier to declare than to deliver.⁴⁵ Without a discussion the EU will have to wait until a crisis presents it with a need to act, which in turn will either result in further European divisions or the temporary by-passing of democratic processes. The EU could play a more prominent role in fostering such a debate which would help build confidence between member states and in turn help to foster that elusive European strategic culture. We will see whether the EU and its member states are ready to take up this challenge in 2004, and as part of their new 2010 horizon for ESDP.

A Coherent Strategy for the EU?

When looking at future security roles of the Union it will be important to include the full range of actors with an interest in a broad security policy in order to convince them that they should redirect their energies, policies and programmes to create synergies in order to pursue security objectives that have previously fallen outside their policy framework. The existing role of the Commission around the world and in security-related areas of development, trade and political dialogue is an important resource to include in any assessment of the EU’s interests.⁴⁶ It also represents

an important resource to call upon in pursuit of a comprehensive security strategy.

Security interests can be identified along classical geographical lines as well as in the values associated with the Union's origins and first described in the Treaty of Amsterdam as safeguarding common values; upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter and those of the Helsinki Final Act; the promotion of international cooperation; the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. These security interests are both regional and global. Indeed, the 'World is the Stage'.⁴⁷

Until 1999 the EU was seen as pursuing these interests through civilian means only and without much coordination between the differing civilian instruments (in particular political, economic and development). This has raised criticisms of the Union as a coherent actor, unable to bring its wealth and economic might to bear for security interests.⁴⁸ The EU, supported by the member states, is now in the process of trying to develop a security framework that incorporates both civilian and military instruments and apply them in a coherent framework to meet commonly agreed security objectives. The difficulty will be in convincing existing actors, including the Commission and the member states, that they can pursue their existing interests and values of the Union by adopting security objectives that might interfere with their current policies and programmes. This debate has yet to be fully played out, but signs of concern exist in the development field where questions are raised about how security objectives will dominate purist development policies.⁴⁹ The ESS states rather bluntly that: 'Security is a precondition of development'.⁵⁰

Regardless of where this debate will lead, it should be a high priority for Javier Solana and the member states to include the widest possible range of affected actors from the member states, the Commission, the Parliament, NGOs and the wider public if effective synergies are to materialize amongst the complex range of actors, policies and instruments potentially at the disposal of the EU in pursuit of common security objectives. Simultaneously, there is also the need to engage with the United States, which is articulating and implementing its own very different approach to security under its National Security Strategy. If European member states and the institutions and agencies of the Union itself cannot always act in a manner coherent with its comprehensive strategy, then how do we expect the US to understand our approach and cooperate? This highlights an urgent need for a security dialogue with the United States to improve transatlantic relations after Iraq but also to help avoid further conflict which will undermine the EU approach, as occurred over Iraq. The situation is serious in that Europeans

and Americans can apparently agree on the threats – WMD and terrorism – but they cannot reconcile or, more specifically, understand one another's approach to security.

Conclusion

The concept of security has undergone significant transformation and policy manifestation during this period from a closely military-related concept during the early part of the Cold War to a broader, comprehensive and cooperative definition represented by the Helsinki Final Act. These two approaches to understanding security are very much alive and play out in contemporary debates on synergizing the different EU instruments that are potentially available for security policy (military, trade, development, political and diplomatic). In Europe they are at the heart of policy not just because Europeans have significant weaknesses in military capabilities but because of an apparent divergence between European and US attitudes to applying force before and above the other security instruments. Europe's emphasis on comprehensive cooperative security is apparently being 'interpreted' by some in the United States as incompatible with providing military force projection derived from the US emphasis on a narrower militarily focussed approach to security.⁵¹

The post-1945 record does not support this 'interpretation', in particular at the member state level, also because the EU's evolution has been intrinsically related to security and crisis management, with the later rapidly evolving since the Treaty of Maastricht. Central to present debates, notably in the development of an EU Security Strategy and in the draft Constitution, is whether Europeans can agree on what aspects of defence (armaments policy, capability generation, military forces, decision-making) need further integration in order for them to collectively deliver on the elusive provision of efficient military capability in support of agreed comprehensive security approaches to international security problems. The Europeans agree with Kofi Annan's adage: 'You can do a lot with diplomacy, but of course you can do a lot more with diplomacy backed up by firmness and force',⁵² but it remains to be seen whether they collectively have the political will to provide the capability.

The Iraq War exemplified this, and it also highlighted complicated nuances within Europe that make any simple statement on the EU as a non-military actor superficial. It is increasingly clear that Europeans and the EU in the Security Strategy see the military dimension of security as an instrument for achieving security policy that must be employed in

the context of a comprehensive security strategy and not as a one-stop solution to manifest political crises. Defence is therefore an instrument of security objectives and not just military ones. This means that it can be employed, but as part of an approach that also envisages other security instruments to be used before (diplomatic, political and economic), during (diplomatic and political) and after (economic, development, diplomatic, trade and political), as well as alongside, the military instrument. This does not mean that Europeans are conflict-shy, nor that they lack commitment to international peace and security; there is plenty of evidence to show otherwise.

This comprehensive approach to understanding security and seeking policy responses can be found in the present European Security Strategy and also in the literature on the EU as a robust civilian actor. Whilst the concept of security most appropriate to the EU might be easily delineated, the ability to transform it into a coherent, active and capable security policy is receiving serious attention by the member states and is being scrutinized by allies, neighbours and analysts alike. In this respect discussions about the use of force in security policy seem almost academic, because European military capability is widely regarded as weak. What is the point, some posit, of discussing whether Europe is a robust civilian power or a security actor with a range of instruments including armed forces, if what emerges crisis after crisis is that member states cannot put together the military capability necessary to act, even in their neighbourhood? There will be opportunity to discuss this if we take up Solana's challenge and that set out by Annan to discuss the impact of the use of force such as in Iraq on multilateral institutions and the rule of law.

The challenge seems more about implementing the security concept and objectives of the EU in the most effective manner. This will determine the success and efficiency of the EU, and its member states, as an international security actor. It requires moving beyond an agreed comprehensive concept, to its implementation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author would like to acknowledge the financial support provided by the European Community's Human Potential Programme through the ESDP democracy project for the research and writing of this article.

NOTES

1. European Council, Presidency Conclusions, paras. 83–6, Brussels 12–13 December 2003.

2. References to the adopted document refer to Javier Solana, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy', Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2003.
3. United States, White House. 'The National Security Strategy of the United States of America', September 2002, accessed at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
4. Ronald Higgins, 'Weapons of Mass Destruction: Rhetoric and Realities', ISIS Policy paper No.85, December 2002, accessed at www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/regpapers/no85.pdf.
5. Alyson Bailes, 'EU and US Strategic Concepts: Facing New International Realities', *International Spectator*, forthcoming, www.iai.it.
6. Javier Solana in speech to the European Union Institute for Security Studies in Paris, 30 June 2003, accessed at <http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/discours/76423.pdf>.
7. Solana (see n.2 above), p.6.
8. *Ibid.*, p.9.
9. *Ibid.*, p.3.
10. *Ibid.*, p.12.
11. Judy Dempsey, 'Words of war: Europe's first security doctrine backs away from a commitment to US-style pre-emption'. *Financial Times*, 5 Dec. 2003.
12. Gerrard Quille, Presentation Madrid Workshop, RTN, 11–14 Dec. 2003, accessed at www.esdpdemocracy.net.
13. Gerrard Quille and Stephen Pullinger, 'The EU Seeking Common Ground for Tackling the Threat from WMD', *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.74, December 2003.
14. Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century*, London: Atlantic Books, 2003.
15. Judy Dempsey, 'Europe loses its innocence over WMD' *Financial Times*, 17 June, 2003.
16. Solana (see n.6 above).
17. The ESS was finally adopted in the Conclusion of the European Council in December 2003 but is made up of several statements, see Quille and Pullinger (n.13 above).
18. Council Joint Action of 17 December 1999, *Official Journal, of the European Communities*, L 331, 23 Dec. 1999, p.11. See also Gerrard Quille, *European Security Review*, No.20, Dec. 2003, accessed at www.isis-europe.org.
19. Gerrard Quille, 'A European Response to WMD: Prevention or Pre-emption?' *European Security Review*, No.18, July 2003.
20. Antonio Missiroli and Gerrard Quille, 'European Security in Flux' in Fraser Cameron (ed.), *The Future of Europe: Integration and Enlargement*, London: Routledge, 2004.
21. Antonio Missiroli, 'The EU and Its Changing Neighbourhoods: Stabilisation, Integration and Partnership', in Judy Batt et al., '*Partners and Neighbours: A CFSP for a Wider Europe*', Paris: Chaillot Papers, No.64, September 2003.
22. Batt (see n.21 above), p.119.
23. Jan Joel Andersson, 'The European Union Security Strategy: Coherence and Capabilities', SIIA, 20 October 2003, accessed at www.iss-eu.org/solana/docsto.pdf.
24. 'Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours', Brussels, COM (2003) 104 final.
25. Batt et al. (see n.21 above)
26. This simple illustration does not neglect the role played by the US, but it serves to highlight a criticism levied against the EU and challenge following the ESS.
27. Solana (see n.2 above), p.14.
28. *Ibid.*, p.14–15.
29. Western European Union (WEU), 'European Security: A Common Concept of the 27 WEU Countries', WEU Council of Ministers, Madrid, 14 Nov. 1995.
30. Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, Title V Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy article J. 1, accessed at www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/amsterdam.html.
31. Karl Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957.

32. Solana (see n.2 above), p.1.
33. See, for instance, The Cotonou Agreement for the Union's role in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific States; the Wider Neighbourhood framework; and the Special Representatives covering the Balkans, the Middle East, the South Caucuses, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Afghanistan and the Great Lakes. All information on the role of the Union in these regions can be found at www.europa.eu.int. See also Esther Brimmer, *The EU's Search for a Strategic Role: ESDP and its Implications for Transatlantic Relations*, Washington: Centre for Transatlantic Relations, 2002.
34. Gerrard Quille and Jocelyn Mawdsley, *Equipping the Rapid Reaction Force: Options for and Constraints on a European Defence Equipment Strategy*, Bonn, BICC Paper 33, 2003.
35. Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, London: Routledge, 1999; Emil Kirchner and John Sperling, 'The New Security Threats in Europe: Theory and Evidence', *Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol.7, No.4, 2002; Hanns Maull, 'Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.69, No.5, 1990.
36. Pullinger, S. and Quille, G., 'Defence equipment for European crisis management' *POLL*, No.123, March 2003.
37. Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, 'Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture', *International Affairs*, Vol.77, No.3, July 2001, pp.587–603.
38. Ibid.
39. Solana (see n.2 above), p.12.
40. Ibid., p.13.
41. Ibid.
42. Franco-British Summit – Declaration on 'Strengthening European Co-operation on Security and Defence', Le Touquet, 4 Feb. 2003, available at: www.ambafrance-uk.org.
43. Franco-British Summit – Declaration on 'Strengthening European Co-operation in Security and Defence', London, 24 Nov. 2003.
44. Michael Friend, 'After Non-Detection, What?' *UNIDIR*, No.38, 2003.
45. Annalisa Monaco, 'The NRF: More than a Paper Army?', *NATO Notes*, Vol.5, No.7, 2003.
46. Bretherton and Vogler (see n.35 above).
47. Sven Biscop and Rik Coolsaert, 'The World is the Stage – A Global Security Strategy for the European Union', ECPR General Conference, Marburg, 18–21 Sept. 2003.
48. Jan Joel Andersson. 'The European Union Security Strategy: Coherence and Capabilities', Discussion Paper, Stockholm, 20 October 2003.
49. This was also discussed in the Working Group on Coherence at the EU Security Strategy Seminar in Stockholm, 20 October 2004. See reports of the seminars at: www.eu-iss.org.
50. Solana (see n.6 above), p.6.
51. Robert Kagan, 'Power and Weakness', *Policy Review*, No.113, June/July 2003.
52. UN Chronicle, online edition accessed at www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/1998/issue1/0198p4_2.html.